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GAMES AND DECISIONS

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GAMES AND DECISIONS

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Academic year 2015/2016

Course ID
ECO0197
Teaching staff
Paolo Ghirardato (Titolare del corso)
Dino Gerardi (Titolare del corso)
Year
2° anno
Type
Affine o integrativo
Credits/Recognition
6
Course disciplinary sector (SSD)
SECS-P/01 - economia politica
Delivery
Tradizionale
Language
Inglese
Attendance
Facoltativa
Type of examination
Orale
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Sommario del corso

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Course objectives

This is a course which introduces students to the formalization and analysis of decision making both in a single-person and in a strategic (i.e., game theory) environment. While the course's emphasis is on theoretical issues, specific attention is given to the application of the concepts developed in class to economic and financial problems. 

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Results of learning outcomes

At the end of the course, the student is expected to be capable of:

-using the basic tools and results to pose, formalize and analyse a single-person or multi-person decision problem 

-knowing the extent to which the results obtained in the previous step are dependent on the assumption that s/he has made about the preferences, information and behavior of actors in the problem

-knowing therefore the extent to which the results are robust to different assumptions on preferences, information and behavior

-being able to think about possible and useful generalizations of the posited model(s)

-being able to communicate such findings using appropriate and clear mathematical notation and language

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Course delivery

The course-work is articulated in 42 hours of formal in-class lecture time (roughly 21 hours devoted to Decisions and 21 hours to Games), and in at least as many hours of at-home work solving practical exercises.

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Learning assessment methods

Generalities:

The course grade is determined solely on the basis of written examinations.  The objective of the examination is to test the student's ability to do the following:

1) Present briefly the main ideas, concepts and results developed in the course, also explaining intuitively the meaning and scope of the definitions and the arguments behind the validity of the results 

2) Use effectively the concepts and the result to answer questions in Economics and related areas --e.g., using a specific decision model to make a policy prescription.

Practicalities:

There are 5 possible exam sessions in each academic year. The first session takes place during the first semester (while the course is being taught), and it is administered in early December in a single comprehensive examination. The remaining four sessions (from January until September) work the same way.

Each exam lasts 165 minutes, and it is typically articulated in 4 questions, roughly half of which are about the Decisions part of the course and half about the Games part of the course. Some of the questions have an essay part, and some of the questions also have a more practical ("exercise") part. Each question is scored between 20 and 40 points, and the maximum score for the exam is typically 120. The final score in 120ths is computed, and it is transformed into 30ths, taking also into account the general class performance in the two exams (i.e, giving some weight to relative, as well as absolute performance).

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Support activities

Weekly homework sets will be assigned, and their solution will be posted and (if time allows) discussed in class.

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Program

As mentioned earlier, the course is divided into two parts:   Part 1 (21 hours): Decisions (Ghirardato) -Introduction and overview of decision models -Known probabilities: The Expected Utility Model -Subjective probability: The Subjective Expected Utility model (Anscombe-Aumann and Savage) -Non-expected utility models: The Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes and their rationalizations   Part 2 (21 hours): Games (Gerardi) -A decision-theoretic approach: Dominance, beliefs and "Never Weak Best Response" strategies -Strategic form games: Dominance, Nash equilibrium, mixed strategies -Extensive Form Games: Corresponding strategic forms, behavioral strategies, backwards induction, subgame perfect equilibrium -Games of Incomplete Information: Normal-form representation of static games of incomplete information, Bayesian Nash equilibrium, perfect -Bayesian equilibrium -Repeated Games: Folk theorems

Suggested readings and bibliography

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The exam is mostly going to be based on the class notes and some readings assigned in class. However, for supplemental reading (and some homework exercises) the following are the suggested textbooks for the course: -David Kreps, Notes on the Theory of Choice, Westwood Press, 1988 (hard, but good as reference) -Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press, 2003 (easier) -Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, The MIT Press, 1994 (harder, but available electronically here)


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More information

https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/343639/web/didattica/gd/gd.html
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